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MISINTERPRETING “SOUNDS OF SILENCE”:   
WHY COURTS SHOULD NOT “IMPLY” 
CONGRESSIONAL PRECLUSION OF § 1983 
CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS 
Rosalie Berger Levinson* 
Despite the clear text of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, its promise to protect 
constitutional rights has been obfuscated by the theory that Congress, by 
enacting civil rights laws, has “impliedly” foreclosed the historic use of 
§ 1983 to vindicate constitutional wrongdoing.  Increasingly, plaintiffs are 
being denied their right to vindicate constitutional wrongdoing, either 
because the new “preempting” federal statute does not trigger individual 
liability or because it makes institutional liability more difficult to establish.   
It is counterintuitive to believe that Congress, in an attempt to expand 
equality or due process, intended to cut off existing remedies for 
constitutional violations.  Nonetheless, a growing number of federal 
appellate courts are invoking the “implied” foreclosure doctrine to curtail 
§ 1983 litigation.  For example, some circuits have held that Title IX of the 
1972 Education Amendments, which prohibits sex discrimination in schools 
that receive federal financial assistance, should be understood to preclude 
a remedy under § 1983 for gender-based discrimination by state educators.  
The same issue arises whenever civil rights statutes create “overlapping” 
remedies for civil rights violations.   
 The Supreme Court is poised to review this analysis.  It has agreed to 
hear the following question:  “Does an implied right of action under Title 
IX of 1972 Education Amendments preclude constitutional claims under 
§ 1983 to remedy sex discrimination by federally funded educational 
institutions?”  After tracing the genesis and expansion of the doctrine, this 
Article provides the arguments for rejecting “implied” congressional 
foreclosure of § 1983 constitutional claims that should govern this case and 
future cases. 
 
* Phyllis and Richard Duesenberg Professor of Law, Valparaiso University School of Law. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In 1803, Chief Justice John Marshall proclaimed in the landmark 
decision of Marbury v. Madison, that “[t]he very essence of civil liberty . . . 
consists in the right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws, 
whenever he receives an injury.”1  Since then, the U.S. Supreme Court has 
struggled with the question of when courts should recognize a remedy for 
the violation of rights.  The Court has grown increasingly reluctant to imply 
“enforceable rights” from federal statutes in the absence of an unambiguous 
manifestation of congressional intent.  However, this Article focuses on 
textual constitutional rights and 42 U.S.C. § 1983,2 which explicitly 
provides a cause of action to remedy federal constitutional violations 
perpetrated “under color of state law.” 
Despite the clear text of § 1983, its promise to protect constitutional 
rights has been obfuscated by the theory that Congress, by enacting civil 
rights laws, has “impliedly” foreclosed the historic use of § 1983 to 
vindicate constitutional wrongdoing.  It is counterintuitive to believe that 
Congress, in an attempt to expand equality or due process, intended to cut 
off existing remedies for constitutional violations.  Nonetheless, a growing 
 
 1. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803).  Ultimately, Justice John 
Marshall determined that, although William Marbury had a right to the judicial commission 
he sought, the U.S. Supreme Court could not hear his case as a matter of original 
jurisdiction.  The Judiciary Act, which authorized such jurisdiction, was unconstitutional. 
 2. Section 1983 provides in relevant part: 
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or 
usage, of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the 
United States . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured 
by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, 
suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . . . 
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000). 
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number of federal appellate courts are invoking the “implied” foreclosure 
doctrine to curtail § 1983 litigation. 
Increasingly, plaintiffs are being denied their right to vindicate 
constitutional wrongdoing, either because the new “preempting” federal 
statute does not trigger individual liability or because it makes institutional 
liability more difficult to establish.  For example, some circuits have held 
that Title IX of the 1972 Education Amendments,3 which prohibits sex 
discrimination in schools that receive federal financial assistance, should be 
understood to preclude a remedy under § 1983 for gender-based 
discrimination by state educators.  The same issue arises whenever civil 
rights statutes create “overlapping” remedies for civil rights violations.4  
Congress does not specifically state that it is precluding the use of § 1983 to 
enforce constitutional claims, but federal courts are “inferring” that 
Congress has done so, contrary to established rules of statutory 
construction. 
The Supreme Court first recognized the “implied” foreclosure doctrine in 
1981 to curtail the expansive use of § 1983 to enforce federal statutes 
unrelated to civil rights.5  Subsequently, in Smith v. Robinson,6 the Court 
invoked the doctrine to hold that the Education of the Handicapped Act 
(EHA) preempted equal protection claims brought under § 1983.7  The 
Court reasoned that this was a unique situation where use of § 1983 would 
destroy Congress’s carefully crafted administrative scheme to identify and 
assist educationally handicapped children, and that it would subject local 
school districts to unintended attorney fee awards.8  The Supreme Court has 
not rendered another constitutional preclusion decision in the twenty-four 
years since Smith was decided, but federal courts have increasingly 
misinterpreted and expanded its reasoning.9  Further, many courts have 
confounded the question of whether § 1983 may be used to enforce newly 
created federal statutory rights with the question of whether a federal statute 
manifests congressional intent to preclude the historic use of § 1983 to 
vindicate federal constitutional rights.10  Although the Supreme Court has 
made it increasingly more difficult to enforce federal statutory rights under 
 
 3. Title IX provides that “[n]o person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be 
excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination 
under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.” 20 U.S.C. 
§ 1681(a) (2000). 
 4. See infra Part III.B. 
 5. See infra Part I. 
 6. 468 U.S. 992 (1984). 
 7. Id. at 1009. 
 8. Id. 
 9. See infra Part III. 
 10. See infra Part III. 
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§ 1983,11 these cases should not be read to breathe new life into the heavily 
criticized Smith decision.12 
The Supreme Court is on the brink of deciding the validity of this 
doctrine in the context of a Title IX claim.13  After tracing the genesis and 
expansion of the doctrine, this Article provides the arguments for rejecting 
“implied” congressional foreclosure of § 1983 constitutional claims that 
should govern this case and future cases.  Part I of this Article traces the 
genesis of the preclusion doctrine that was initially used to prevent § 1983 
from vindicating federal statutory violations.  Part II explains the Court’s 
misguided expansion of the congressional foreclosure theory in Smith v. 
Robinson to cut off § 1983 constitutional claims.  Part III describes the 
circuit split over whether federal civil rights statutes, such as Titles VI and 
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and Title IX of the 1972 Education 
Amendments, preempt constitutional claims brought under § 1983.  Finally, 
Part IV explains why the implied congressional preclusion theory is ill-
conceived and should be rejected when constitutional rights are implicated. 
I.  THE GENESIS OF IMPLIED CONGRESSIONAL PRECLUSION—FEDERAL 
STATUTORY RIGHTS 
Congress enacted § 1983 during the Reconstruction Era to guarantee 
protection for the rights secured by the recently ratified Fourteenth 
Amendment—namely due process and equal protection.14  The key concern 
was to provide an impartial federal forum for a state’s violation of 
constitutional rights.15  However, the text of § 1983 creates a remedy not 
only for constitutional violations, but also for the violation of rights secured 
by the laws of the United States.16  Initially it was believed that § 1983 was 
limited to enforcing laws “providing for equal rights” or civil rights because 
28 U.S.C. § 1343(3), which is the jurisdictional counterpart to § 1983, 
contains this limiting language.17  Nonetheless, in 1980 the Supreme Court 
 
 11. See infra Part I. 
 12. See infra Part II. 
 13. Fitzgerald v. Barnstable Sch. Comm., 504 F.3d 165 (1st Cir. 2007), cert. granted, 
128 S. Ct. 2903 (2008); see also infra notes 108–15, 160–61 and accompanying text. 
 14. See Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 25 n.15 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting). 
 15. Id. at 20. 
 16. See supra note 2.  The original text of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 created a private 
cause of action only for the deprivation of constitutional rights. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. at 15.  In 
1874, Congress, in its comprehensive revision and codification of the United States statutes, 
added the phrase “and laws” to § 1 of the Civil Rights Act. Id. at 7.  Although the statutory 
revisions were meant only to “clarif[y] and reorganize[] [existing law] without changing 
substance,” id. at 8 n.5, when Representative Lawrence read the new provision on the floor 
of the House of Representatives, he stated that the revised provisions “possibly [show] 
verbal modifications bordering on legislation,” id. at 7–8 (citing 2 CONG. REC. 825, 827 
(1874)).  Thus it was unclear whether Congress intended to substantively change the statute. 
 17. The statute provides that, 
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action authorized by 
law to be commenced by any person . . . [t]o redress the deprivation, under color of 
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ruled that “and laws” means precisely what it says:  “Congress attached no 
modifiers to the phrase . . . .”18  Thus, § 1983 provides a remedy for 
violation of all statutes, including the Social Security Act at issue in this 
case, even though this is not a law aimed at guaranteeing equal rights.19 
In a stinging dissent, Justice Lewis Powell opined that state and local 
government would now be liable for violating dozens of federal statutes that 
Congress had enacted over the past half century, contrary to the original 
goal of § 1983, which was to vindicate civil rights violations.20  Further, 
because the Court expressly held that attorney’s fees could be recovered for 
statutory suits, plaintiffs had a strong incentive to sue under § 1983.21 
One year later, the Supreme Court responded to this expansive 
interpretation of § 1983 by recognizing two exceptions to using § 1983 as a 
cause of action to vindicate violations of federal statutory rights: 
1. Where the federal statute does not create specific enforceable rights, 
privileges, or immunities within the meaning of § 1983;22 and 
2. Where Congress has foreclosed such enforcement of the federal 
statute either explicitly or implicitly in the statute’s remedial 
scheme.23 
As to the first exception, it is well established that § 1983 provides only a 
cause of action—a vehicle for enforcing rights that have their source in the 
Constitution or a federal statute.24  Thus, the reference to “enforceable 
rights, privileges, or immunities” in § 1983 focuses on whether Congress 
 
any State law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any right, 
privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution of the United States or by any 
Act of Congress providing for equal rights of citizens or of all persons within the 
jurisdiction of the United States. 
28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(3) (2000) (emphasis added).  In Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights 
Organization, the Supreme Court held that § 1343(3) did not give federal jurisdiction over 
violation of statutory rights that did not secure “equal rights.” 441 U.S. 600, 603 (1979).  
Although the Court did not address the “and laws” language in § 1983, a concurring opinion 
by Justice Lewis Powell, joined by Chief Justice Warren Burger and Justice William 
Rehnquist, urged that “and laws” should be read as “no more than a shorthand reference to 
the equal rights legislation enacted by Congress.” Id. at 624 (Powell, J., concurring). 
 18. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. at 4 (“[T]he § 1983 remedy broadly encompasses violations of 
federal statutory as well as constitutional law.”). 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. at 22 (Powell, J., dissenting).  Justice Powell pointed to historical evidence 
suggesting that the words “and laws” “was—and remains—nothing more than a shorthand 
reference to equal rights legislation enacted by Congress.” Id. at 12.  Justice Powell stated 
that the majority’s interpretation ignored “the lessons of history, logic, and policy.” Id.  He 
then provided an appendix listing twenty-eight federal statutes that could now arguably 
subject states to § 1983 litigation. Id. at 34–37. 
 21. Id. at 24. 
 22. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 28 (1981). 
 23. See Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. Nat’l Sea Clammers Ass’n, 453 U.S. 1, 20 
(1981). 
 24. IVAN E. BODENSTEINER & ROSALIE BERGER LEVINSON, STATE & LOCAL 
GOVERNMENT CIVIL RIGHTS LIABILITY § 1:20, 1–899 (1987). 
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has definitively created rights that may be enforced under § 1983.  Initially, 
the Supreme Court exhibited a great willingness to find statutorily 
enforceable rights.25  In Livadas v. Bradshaw, it broadly proclaimed that 
statutory rights claims should be “generally and presumptively available” 
under § 1983.26 
However, in recent years, the Supreme Court has ratcheted up the test for 
finding federal statutory rights.  It has rejected claims where the statutory 
requirements were considered too “vague or amorphous” to be judicially 
enforceable by private parties27 or where plaintiffs could not show that they 
were the intended beneficiaries of the law.28  Further, in Gonzaga 
University v. Doe,29 the Court ruled that federal statutory claims cannot be 
privately enforced under § 1983 unless Congress manifests an intent to 
confer individual rights “in clear and unambiguous terms.”30  The Court 
 
 25. See, e.g., Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107, 133 (1994) (holding that the National 
Labor Relations Act was sufficiently clear and mandatory so as to create collective 
bargaining rights on behalf of employees); Wilder v. Va. Hosp. Ass’n, 496 U.S. 498, 510–12 
(1990) (holding that the Boren Amendment to the Medicaid Act, which required states to 
adopt reasonable and adequate rates for medical services, created enforceable rights on 
behalf of hospital providers); Wright v. City of Roanoke Redev. & Hous. Auth., 479 U.S. 
418, 432 (1987) (holding that the Brooke Amendment to the Housing Act conferred benefits 
on tenants that were “sufficiently specific and definite to qualify as enforceable rights under 
Pennhurst and § 1983”). 
 26. Livadas, 512 U.S. at 133. 
 27. See, e.g., Suter v. Artist M., 503 U.S. 347, 363–64 (1992) (holding that the 
requirement that states take “reasonable efforts” under the Adoption Assistance and Child 
Welfare Act was too vague and amorphous to create individually enforceable rights under 
§ 1983). 
 28. Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 340–41, 343 (1997) (holding that custodial 
parents whose children qualify for state child support under Title IV-D of the Social Security 
Act may not sue under § 1983 to redress deficiencies in a state’s child support enforcement 
law because the plaintiffs could not show that the requirement was intended to benefit 
individual children and custodial parents, rather than simply providing a yardstick for the 
Secretary to measure the system-wide performance of a state’s Title IV-D program). 
 29. 536 U.S. 273 (2002). 
 30. Id. at 290.  The Court held that the Family Education Rights and Privacy Act, which 
prohibits educational institutions that receive federal funds from disclosing educational 
records without consent, lacked the kind of “rights-creating language” necessary to 
demonstrate congressional intent to create new rights because the provision focused on those 
regulated rather than on the individuals protected. Id. at 290.  The nondisclosure provision 
spoke in terms of institutional policies and practices and mandated that recipient institutions 
“comply substantially” with the Act’s requirement, thus negating congressional intent to 
confer individual rights. Id. at 287–88.  Significantly, the Court reasoned that the question of 
whether a statute creates a private cause of action is identical to the initial question used to 
determine whether a statute creates rights enforceable under § 1983, namely whether 
“Congress intends to create new individual rights.” Id. at 283–84, 286.  Previously, the 
Supreme Court had emphasized that the § 1983 inquiry 
is a different inquiry than that involved in determining whether a private right of 
action can be implied from a particular statute.  In implied right of action cases, we 
. . . determine “whether Congress intended to create the private remedy asserted” 
for the violation of statutory rights.  The test reflects a concern, grounded in 
separation of powers, that Congress rather than the courts controls the availability 
of remedies for violations of statutes.  Because § 1983 provides an “alternative 
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adopted a textualist approach, mandating that the “text must be ‘phrased in 
terms of the persons benefited,’”31 and that Congress “make its intention [to 
create rights] ‘unmistakably clear in the language of the statute.’”32 
In contrast, this Article discusses congressional foreclosure of a remedy 
for explicit federal constitutional claims, and thus there is no need to imply 
any “rights.”  Nonetheless, this history is important because it demonstrates 
that the foreclosure theory arose from the Court’s concern that laws having 
nothing to do with civil rights could be enforced under § 1983.  Further, the 
Court’s adoption of a strict textualist approach militates against its use of a 
doctrine founded on judicial “inference” of unstated congressional intent.33 
As noted, the second exception to the enforceability of federal statutes 
asks whether Congress explicitly or implicitly intended to foreclose the use 
of § 1983 to enforce the statutory rights.34  Although Congress certainly has 
the authority to decide that § 1983 is not available as an enforcement 
mechanism for its newly created statutory rights, it has never made specific 
reference to § 1983 in any federal statute.  However, the Supreme Court has 
held that courts may “infer” congressional intent to foreclose a § 1983 cause 
of action where a law has its own “comprehensive enforcement 
mechanisms.”35  The rationale is that Congress would not have intended to 
 
source of express congressional authorization of private suits,” these separation-of-
powers concerns are not present in a § 1983 case. 
Wilder, 496 U.S. at 508 n.9 (citations omitted); see also Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. 
v. Nat’l Sea Clammers Ass’n, 453 U.S. 1, 18–19 (1981) (reasoning that a plaintiff’s failure 
to prove that a private cause of action may be inferred from a statute does not necessarily 
preclude a remedy under § 1983 based on that statute).  Although, in Gonzaga University v. 
Doe, Justice Rehnquist noted the analytic overlap between implying causes of action and 
recognizing statutory rights, he acknowledged that the analysis is still distinct because a 
claim of implied rights requires a finding of a remedy within the statute, whereas § 1983 
provides presumptive relief once a plaintiff establishes a privately enforceable right. 536 
U.S. at 283–84. 
 31. Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 284 (citing Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 US. 677, 692 n.13 
(1979)). 
 32. Id. at 286 (quoting Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 65 (1989)).  For 
a critique of this new, more stringent approach, see Bradford C. Mank, Suing Under § 1983:  
The Future After Gonzaga University v. Doe, 39 HOUS. L. REV. 1417, 1419–20 (2003) 
(“[T]he Gonzaga decision places a heavy and unnecessary burden of proof on plaintiffs by 
requiring unambiguous and explicit evidence that Congress intended to create an individual 
right benefitting a class including the plaintiff.”). 
 33. The Supreme Court’s strong presumption against finding federal statutory rights is 
founded on separation of powers concerns, namely that legislative action, rather than judicial 
policy making, should govern. See, e.g., Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 300 (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(“[O]ur implied right of action cases reflec[t] a concern, grounded in separation of powers, 
that Congress rather than the courts controls the availability of remedies for violations of 
statutes.” (citing Wilder, 496 U.S. at 509 n.9) (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also 
supra note 30. 
 34. See supra note 23 and accompanying text. 
 35. Middlesex, 453 U.S. at 19–20.  The Court reasoned that the existence of express 
remedies in the environmental laws at issue demonstrated that Congress “intended to 
supplant any remedy that otherwise would be available under § 1983.” Id. at 21.  More 
broadly, the Court explained that Congress can implicitly cut off recourse to § 1983 “[w]hen 
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permit plaintiffs to circumvent a carefully crafted remedial scheme by 
invoking § 1983 to enforce statutory rights.36 
The Supreme Court initially indicated that it would not lightly imply 
congressional intent to cut off a § 1983 suit.37  Thus, although plaintiffs 
carry the initial burden of proving that a federal statute creates enforceable 
rights, the burden then shifts to the government to demonstrate “by express 
provision or other specific evidence from the statute itself that Congress 
intended to foreclose such private enforcement [of the right].”38  Further, 
the Court indicated that the existence of administrative remedies in a statute 
should not alone preclude § 1983 litigation,39 and that preclusion should be 
viewed as the “exceptional case.”40 
However, in recent years the Supreme Court has made it easier for the 
government to demonstrate implied foreclosure.  For example, in City of 
Rancho Palos Verdes v. Abrams,41 the Court assumed that the 
Telecommunications Act created rights on behalf of individuals,42 but it 
ruled that the comprehensive nature of the Act demonstrated Congress’s 
intent to foreclose the use of § 1983 to enforce these rights.43  Although 
refusing to adopt a flat rule, the Court reasoned that where a law creates its 
own private judicial enforcement remedy, this is “ordinarily an indication 
that Congress did not intend to leave open a more expansive remedy under 
§ 1983.”44  The Court conceded that, despite the availability of a judicial 
 
the remedial devices provided in a particular Act are sufficiently comprehensive . . . to 
demonstrate congressional intent to preclude the remedy of suits under § 1983.” Id. at 20.  
As the dissent opined, the Court ignored the explicit “savings clauses” in the statutes that 
preserved “any right which any person (or class of persons) may have under any statute or 
common law.” Id. at 29 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 36. Id. at 20; see also Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 673 n.2 
(1979) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (“When a state official is alleged to have violated a federal 
statute which provides its own comprehensive enforcement scheme, the requirements of that 
enforcement procedure may not be bypassed by bringing suit directly under § 1983.”). 
 37. Wright v. City of Roanoke Redev. & Hous. Auth., 479 U.S. 418, 423–25 (1987) 
(reasoning that nothing in the Brooke Amendment, or its legislative history, indicated 
congressional foreclosure and the remedial mechanism was not “sufficiently comprehensive 
and effective to raise a clear inference that Congress intended to foreclose a § 1983 cause of 
action for the enforcement of tenants’ rights secured by federal law”); see also Cass R. 
Sunstein, Section 1983 and the Private Enforcement of Federal Law, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 394, 
427–29 (1982) (suggesting several criteria that courts should use in implementing this 
exception to Thiboutot, such as whether the statute creates an independent cause of action 
against state officials or whether it demands consistency and coordination in enforcement). 
 38. Wright, 479 U.S. at 423; see also Wilder, 496 U.S. at 508 (holding that congressional 
intent to preclude must be found in the enactment). 
 39. Wilder, 496 U.S. at 522. 
 40. Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107, 133 (1994); see also Wilder, 496 U.S. at 520 
(asserting that “‘[w]e do not lightly conclude that Congress intended to preclude reliance’” 
on § 1983 statutory claims (quoting Wright, 479 U.S. at 423–24)). 
 41. 544 U.S. 113 (2005). 
 42. Id. at 120. 
 43. Id. at 126–27. 
 44. Id. at 121.  The Court distinguished earlier decisions permitting § 1983 claims as 
cases where the federal statute did not provide a private judicial or administrative remedy. 
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remedy in a statute, a “presumption” of foreclosure “can surely be 
overcome by textual indication, express or implicit, that the remedy is to 
complement, rather than supplant, § 1983.”45  Nonetheless, this 
presumption appears to shift the burden onto plaintiffs to disprove 
“implicit” foreclosure, contrary to earlier Supreme Court rulings that 
imposed a heavy burden on the defendants to present specific evidence 
clearly demonstrating congressional intent to foreclose a § 1983 cause of 
action.46  As discussed in Part III, some appellate courts have erroneously 
relied on Rancho Palos Verdes to justify their inference of congressional 
foreclosure of constitutional claims. 
II.  IMPLIED CONGRESSIONAL FORECLOSURE OF CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS:  
SMITH V. ROBINSON 
The Supreme Court took the implied congressional foreclosure doctrine 
established in Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea 
Clammers Ass’n47 one step further in 1984.  In Smith, the plaintiff, a special 
education student suffering from cerebral palsy, alleged that he was denied 
equal educational opportunity because of his learning disabilities.48  He 
 
Id.; cf. Wilder, 496 U.S. at 522 (reasoning that a law’s administrative remedies should not 
alone preclude a § 1983 cause of action). 
 45. Rancho Palos Verdes, 544 U.S. at 122.  It is noteworthy that concurring opinions by 
five Justices urged a more cautious approach.  Justice Stephen Breyer emphasized that 
“context, not just literal text” should be examined in assessing congressional intent with 
respect to a particular statute. Id. at 127 (Breyer, J., concurring).  Justice John Paul Stevens 
similarly stated that legislative history, not just text, must be examined to determine whether 
a statute’s “comprehensive and exclusive remedial scheme” impliedly foreclosed the § 1983 
remedy, characterizing Rancho Palos Verdes v. Abrams as the “exceptional case.” Id. at 129, 
131 (Stevens, J., concurring) (emphasis omitted).  On the other hand, the Court found that 
the “savings clause” in the Act, which specifically stated that this statute should not be 
construed to limit other available remedies, did not negate implicit preclusion of litigation 
under § 1983. See id. at 126. 
 46. See supra notes 37–40 and accompanying text.  Justice Stevens, in his concurrence, 
opined that the Court was too quick to rebut the presumption of enforceability under § 1983, 
and he urged that preclusion be found only in exceptional cases. See Rancho Palos Verdes, 
544 U.S. at 131 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
  The impact of Rancho Palos Verdes on the use of § 1983 to enforce federal statutory 
rights is already being felt in the lower courts.  For example, in A.W. v. Jersey City Public 
Schools, 486 F.3d 791 (3d Cir. 2007), the court, relying primarily on Rancho Palos Verdes, 
reversed its earlier holding that a § 1983 damages action may be brought against public 
school officials to enforce rights under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act 
(IDEA):  “[T]he Supreme Court’s discussion of the availability of § 1983 as a vehicle for 
redressing violations of federal statutory rights in Rancho Palos Verdes has tipped [the 
scales] definitively, and we are now convinced that our ruling in [W.B. v.] Matula is no 
longer sound.” Id. at 799 (citation omitted).  The court explained that because the IDEA 
includes an express, private means of redress, § 1983 relief to remedy violation of IDEA-
created rights was unavailable absent some “‘textual indication, express or implicit, that the 
[statutory] remedy is to complement, rather than supplant, § 1983.’” Id. at 802 (quoting 
Rancho Palos Verdes, 544 U.S. at 122) (alteration in original). 
 47. 453 U.S. 1 (1981) 
 48. Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 995 (1984). 
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sued for relief under two federal statutes, the EHA49 and the Rehabilitation 
Act,50 as well as under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  The plaintiff was granted relief under the EHA by 
the lower courts.  Because the EHA did not contain a fee provision, the 
plaintiff relied on his constitutional claims brought under § 1983 to secure 
attorney’s fees.51 
The Supreme Court rejected the § 1983 claim, reasoning that Congress 
intended the EHA to be the “exclusive avenue” for the vindication of the 
right to a publicly financed special education.52  First, the Court noted that 
§ 1983 could not be used to enforce federal statutory rights created under 
the EHA, because the Act provided its own comprehensive enforcement 
mechanism.53  The Court then refused to recognize the equal protection 
claim, which was “virtually identical” to the statutory claim, holding that 
Congress also intended to preclude the use of § 1983 to enforce a 
constitutional right to equal educational opportunity.54  The Supreme Court 
conceded that preclusion was a grave decision,55 and it left open the 
possibility of pursuing due process claims where school districts fail to 
comply with the procedural requirements of the EHA, because the Act itself 
contained no provision for enforcement of the decisions made by 
administrative agencies.56 
The need to avoid an award of attorney’s fees dominated the Court’s 
analysis.  The majority cited the court of appeals’ ruling that “Congress 
could not have intended its omission of attorney’s fees relief [in the EHA] 
to be rectified by recourse to § 1988,”57 and it repeated the concern that 
“fees would become available in almost every case” if litigants could obtain 
them by simply tacking on a § 1983 claim.58  The majority conceded that 
the Supreme Court had permitted fees where plaintiffs succeeded on 
statutory claims, even when constitutional claims were left unaddressed, but 
this “was to avoid penalizing a litigant for the fact that courts are properly 
reluctant to resolve constitutional questions if a nonconstitutional claim is 
 
 49. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400–1485 (2000). 
 50. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2000). 
 51. Smith, 468 U.S. at 1005.  Section 1988 provides that the prevailing party in an action 
prosecuted under § 1983 may be awarded reasonable attorney’s fees. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 
(2000). 
 52. Smith, 468 U.S. at 1009. 
 53. See id. at 1008 n.11. 
 54. Id. at 1009. 
 55. Id. at 1012 (“We do not lightly conclude that Congress intended to preclude reliance 
on § 1983 as a remedy for a substantial equal protection claim.”). 
 56. Id. at 1014 n.17; see also Robinson v. Pinderhughes, 810 F.2d 1270 (4th Cir. 1987) 
(holding that § 1983 may be used to enforce an administrative decision rendered under the 
Education of the Handicapped Act (EHA)); Manecke v. Sch. Bd., 762 F.2d 912, 919 (11th 
Cir. 1985) (“The plain language of the statute itself . . . suggests that Congress must not have 
intended the EHA to be the exclusive method to redress denial of access to that very 
mechanism.”). 
 57. Smith, 468 U.S. at 1003. 
 58. Id. (footnote omitted). 
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dispositive.”59  Allowing fees here would be contrary to the rule that, to 
secure fees, the constitutional claim must be “reasonably related to 
plaintiff’s ultimate success.”60 
In rejecting the plaintiff’s Rehabilitation Act claim, which also would 
have provided fees, the Court suggested why the EHA does not contain a 
fees provision, namely “Congress’ awareness of the financial burden 
already imposed on States by the responsibility of providing education for 
handicapped children.”61  It reasoned that Congress wanted to ensure a free 
appropriate public education, but at the same time limit the financial burden 
imposed on local government—allowing fees and damages would be 
contrary to this carefully constructed balance.62  In essence, the majority 
echoed the defendant’s concern that “petitioners simply are attempting to 
circumvent the lack of a provision for attorney’s fees in the EHA by 
resorting to the pleading trick of adding surplus constitutional claims.”63 
Although the concern for fees was a driving force, the core holding of 
Smith is that plaintiffs who bring constitutional claims pursuant to § 1983 
that are “virtually identical” to the statutory claims will be precluded if 
there is evidence that Congress intended the statute to serve as the exclusive 
remedy.64  In Smith, the majority found that “Congress intended 
handicapped children with constitutional claims to a free appropriate public 
education to pursue those claims through the carefully tailored 
administrative and judicial mechanism set out in the statute.”65  The Act 
required that “fair” and “adequate” hearings be conducted by the state and 
that “each child’s individual educational needs be worked out through a 
process that begins on the local level and includes ongoing parental 
involvement, detailed procedural safeguards, and a right to judicial 
review.”66  The Court emphasized that allowing the § 1983 action would 
encourage circumvention of the carefully crafted procedural requirements 
set forth in the Act.67  Smith mandates, then, both a determination that (1) 
the federal statutory claims are “virtually identical” to the constitutional 
claims, and (2) that the remedies provided in the statute indicate 
congressional intent to preclude a Constitution-based § 1983 claim.68  
Recovery under § 1983 is foreclosed only if both factors are satisfied. 
 
 59. Id. at 1007 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 94-1558, at 4 n.7 (1976)). 
 60. Id. at 1007 n.10. “[W]here it is clear that the claims that provide for attorney’s fees 
had nothing to do with a plaintiff’s success, Hensley [v. Eckerhart] . . . requires that fees not 
be awarded on the basis of those claims.” Id. at 1009 n.12. 
 61. Id. at 1020. 
 62. Id. at 1021. 
 63. Id. at 1005. 
 64. Id. at 1009. 
 65. Id.  
 66. Id. at 1011 (citing 20 U.S.C. §§ 1412(4), 1414(a)(5), 1415 (2000)). 
 67. Id. at 1011–12 (“No federal district court presented with a constitutional claim . . . 
can duplicate that process.”). 
 68. Id. at 1013. 
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The dissent in Smith attacked the majority for its use of the congressional 
foreclosure doctrine, opining that there was no indication that Congress 
intended to restrict, rather than enlarge, rights available to children who 
were denied their right to an equal educational opportunity in public 
schools.69  Congress apparently agreed that the Court had misconstrued its 
intent, and it responded swiftly by enacting the Handicapped Children’s 
Protection Act, which provides that “[n]othing in the EHA shall be read to 
foreclose relief under any other federal law,” thus, in essence, overturning 
the Smith holding.70  Perhaps, in part, because of the sharp rebuke from 
Congress, the Supreme Court since 1984 has not invoked the congressional 
foreclosure doctrine to preempt plaintiffs from bringing constitutional 
claims under § 1983.71  Several appellate courts, however, have 
misconstrued the maligned decision to broadly restrict civil liberties.72 
III.  THE CIRCUIT SPLIT ON IMPLIED CONGRESSIONAL FORECLOSURE 
The issue of implied congressional foreclosure of constitutional claims 
has generated significant litigation and circuit splits.  For example, courts 
are divided as to whether Title IX, which prohibits gender discrimination by 
federally funded educational institutions, should be interpreted to preclude 
§ 1983 gender biased claims.73  The U.S. Courts of Appeals for the First, 
Second, Third, and Seventh Circuits have held that, by enacting Title IX, 
Congress intended to partially or wholly “preempt” plaintiffs from bringing 
§ 1983 equal protection claims alleging gender discrimination in 
education.74  In contrast, the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Sixth, Eighth, 
and Tenth Circuits have flatly rejected such arguments.75  Similarly, the 
federal courts disagree as to whether Congress, when it amended Title VII 
 
 69. Id. at 1025 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 70. The Handicapped Children’s Protection Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-372, 100 Stat. 
796 (1986) (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1415(l)), provides that, “Nothing in this title shall be 
construed to restrict or limit the rights, procedures, and remedies available under the 
Constitution . . . .”  The Act thus allowed EHA rights, as well as constitutional rights, to be 
enforced under § 1983. W.B. v. Matula, 67 F.3d 484, 493–94 (3d Cir. 1995); cf. A.W. v. 
Jersey City Pub. Sch., 486 F.3d 791 (3d Cir. 2007) (holding that the successor to EHA, the 
IDEA, is not enforceable under § 1983). 
 71. Surprisingly only nineteen Supreme Court decisions cite to Smith and none use its 
analysis to support congressional foreclosure of § 1983 constitutional claims.  The Supreme 
Court has ruled that Title VII provides the exclusive remedy for federal employees alleging 
race discrimination in employment, thereby trumping a § 1981 claim. Brown v. Gen. Servs. 
Admin., 425 U.S. 820 (1976).  However, this case did not involve constitutional claims or 
§ 1983. See Zewde v. Elgin Cmty. Coll., 601 F. Supp. 1237, 1248 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (rejecting 
Title VII’s preclusion of constitutional claims and distinguishing Brown as raising “no 
question of implied or express repeal of an existing and clear legislative grant of redress for 
constitutional violations; nothing akin to § 1983 had been on the books for federal 
employees”). 
 72. See infra Part III. 
 73. See Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681; see also supra note 3. 
 74. See infra notes 79–115 and accompanying text. 
 75. See infra notes 116–29 and accompanying text. 
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of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to reach state and local government, 
intended to preclude government employees from bringing constitutional 
claims under § 1983.76  This part explores these cases, as well as those 
raising the same issue regarding Title VI, the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act (ADEA), and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). 
Ironically, Title IX, which on its face does not include any private cause 
of action,77 has been interpreted by many appellate courts to preclude a 
§ 1983 equal protection claim, whereas Title VII, which includes a 
comprehensive remedial scheme with both administrative and judicial 
remedies,78 has generally not been found to supplant constitutional claims 
under § 1983.  The thesis of this Article is that neither the text nor 
legislative history, nor any other theory of statutory construction, warrants a 
finding that Congress intended Title IX or Title VII to foreclose the § 1983 
remedy. 
A.  Congressional Foreclosure Under Title IX 
In Bruneau ex rel. Schofield v. South Kortright Central School District,79 
the Second Circuit held that Title IX precludes a separate count under 
§ 1983 for violation of a student’s equal protection rights.  Eve Bruneau, a 
twelve-year-old student, was relentlessly harassed by her male classmates 
who snapped her bra straps, poked and pinched her body, and called her 
“whore,” “bitch,” and “lesbian.”80  Eve’s teacher told her she would have to 
learn to handle the situation, and school authorities refused to transfer Eve 
to another class, despite her parents’ repeated pleas for help.81  To succeed 
under Title IX, Eve would have to prove that school officials acted with 
actual knowledge of the harassment and with deliberate indifference.82  
Further, she could not sue the school officials responsible for ignoring her 
sexual harassment claims.83  In contrast, § 1983 creates individual liability 
 
 76. See infra notes 171–75 and accompanying text. 
 77. See infra notes 153–56 and accompanying text. 
 78. See infra notes 167–68 and accompanying text. 
 79. 163 F.3d 749 (2d Cir. 1998). 
 80. David Behrens, An Unwanted Lesson in Law, NEWSDAY (N.Y.), Nov. 18, 1996, at 
A5. 
 81. Id. 
 82. See Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 650–52 (1999) (holding 
that school districts are not liable for student-on-student sexual harassment unless they 
actually knew of and deliberately ignored redressing the violation); Gebser v. Lago Vista 
Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 290 (1998) (holding that students could not sue their school 
districts for their teachers’ sexually harassing or abusive conduct unless the students could 
show that an “appropriate person” with actual knowledge of the harassment and with the 
ability to take corrective action was deliberately indifferent to that knowledge). 
 83. Officials in their personal capacities are not liable under Title IX. See, e.g., Soper v. 
Hoben, 195 F.3d 845, 854 (6th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1262 (2000) (holding that 
members of a school board could not be sued in their individual capacities under Title IX in 
an action alleging sexual harassment by fellow students); Hartley v. Parnell, 193 F.3d 1263, 
1270 (11th Cir. 1999) (holding that school superintendent could not be held liable under 
Title IX for a school teacher’s alleged sexual abuse of a student); Kinman v. Omaha Pub. 
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for those who act “under color of state law,”84 and it does not impose the 
onerous “actual knowledge” standard for entity liability.85  Nonetheless, the 
court reasoned that the sexual harassment allegation under the Equal 
Protection Clause was identical to the Title IX claim, and thus it dismissed 
the § 1983 claim.86  The court reasoned that where § 1983 and Title IX 
claims are based on the same factual predicate, “Title IX provides the 
exclusive remedial avenue.”87 
In Williams v. School District,88 the Third Circuit similarly held that, 
because the plaintiff’s constitutional claims were “subsumed” in the Title 
IX claims, the district court erred in addressing the constitutional claims 
brought under § 1983 once it ruled on the Title IX issue.89  The court 
explained that Title IX’s comprehensive scheme precluded litigants from 
bringing equal protection claims under § 1983, thereby applying the 
statutory “comprehensiveness” test to what was clearly a Constitution-
based § 1983 claim.90  Although the comprehensiveness of a statutory 
remedial scheme may be a factor in assessing congressional intent to 
 
Sch. Dist., 171 F.3d 607, 610–11 (8th Cir. 1999) (finding that teacher involved in a sexual 
relationship with a student could not be held liable under Title IX in her individual capacity); 
Smith v. Metro. Sch. Dist. Perry Twp., 128 F.3d 1014, 1018–21 (7th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 
524 U.S. 951 (1998) (holding that only a grant recipient can violate Title IX, and thus neither 
principal nor assistant principal could be sued in their individual capacities). 
 84. A defendant acts under color of state law when he “ha[s] exercised power ‘possessed 
by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the 
authority of state law.’” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 49 (1988) (quoting United States v. 
Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941)).  Such government officials may be sued for damages in 
their personal capacity—subject, however, to an absolute or qualified immunity defense.  
Thus, if school officials (teachers, principals, or other employees) sexually harass or 
otherwise violate the equal protection or due process rights of other teachers or students, 
they may be held liable in their personal capacity for any resulting injury. See BODENSTEINER 
& LEVINSON, supra note 24, §§ 1:03, 1A:03–1A:18. 
 85. If a policy maker commits the wrongdoing, the entity is liable, even for a single 
decision of that official. See Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 481 (1986) 
(holding that government entities are responsible for the acts and decisions of their 
employees with policy-making authority).  For government wrongdoing by non–policy 
makers, plaintiff must prove that a policy or custom caused the deprivation of rights or that a 
failure to train, supervise, or screen demonstrated deliberate indifference to constitutional or 
federal statutory rights, which caused their violation. See BODENSTEINER & LEVINSON, supra 
note 24, §§ 1:6–1:7. 
 86. Bruneau ex rel. Schofield v. S. Kortright Cent. Sch. Dist., 163 F.3d 749, 757–58 (2d 
Cir. 1998). 
 87. Id. at 758. 
 88. 998 F.2d 168 (3d Cir. 1993). 
 89. Id. at 176. 
 90. Id.; see also Pfeiffer v. Marion Ctr. Area Sch. Dist., 917 F.2d 779, 789 (3d Cir. 
1990) (holding that a pregnant teen dismissed from her high school’s chapter of the National 
Honor Society for engaging in premarital sex could not pursue her gender discrimination 
claim under § 1983 because Title IX’s statutory scheme provided an enforcement 
mechanism comprehensive enough to preclude relief under § 1983); Kemether v. Pa. 
Interscholastic Athletic Ass’n, Inc., 15 F. Supp. 2d 740 (E.D. Pa. 1998) (holding that 
plaintiff’s constitutional claims pursued through § 1983 are subsumed within her Title IX 
claim, and must be precluded). 
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foreclose Constitution-based § 1983 relief, it should not be viewed as a 
decisive factor, as it is when plaintiffs seek to use § 1983 to enforce 
statutory rights.  When Congress carefully constructs a remedial scheme for 
enforcing statutory rights, it is easier to infer that that remedial scheme, and 
not § 1983, should be used.91  Further, the court ignored the first of Smith’s 
two-pronged analysis—the requirement that the statutory and constitutional 
claims be “virtually identical”—in ruling that both due process and equal 
protection claims were preempted.92 
The Seventh and Third Circuits have taken a somewhat more nuanced 
approach to the preclusion doctrine, adopting a “partial” preemption 
position.  The Seventh Circuit initially held that all § 1983 litigation 
alleging sex discrimination by public educational institutions was 
preempted by Title IX.  In Boulahanis v. Board of Regents,93 the Seventh 
Circuit reasoned that Congress intended Title IX to be the exclusive regime 
for redress of sex discrimination in athletic opportunities at federally funded 
institutions, thereby foreclosing a § 1983 equal protection claim.94  The 
court acknowledged that Title IX did not reach claims brought against 
individual school officials, but, rather, only the recipient of the federal 
financial assistance was a proper defendant.95  Nonetheless, it upheld the 
district court’s determination that the availability of a claim against the 
institution “preempts” all remedies for sex discrimination under § 1983.96 
Subsequently, the Seventh Circuit reevaluated its conclusion regarding 
total preemption.  In Delgado v. Stegall,97 it held that Title IX foreclosed 
claims against Western Illinois University officials under § 1983, but it 
permitted the § 1983 suit to proceed against the teacher who sexually 
harassed the plaintiff.98  The court found “no hint” in the “background or 
history of Title IX” that Congress intended to supplant relief sought against 
individual wrongdoers.99  Indeed, in interpreting Title IX, the Supreme 
Court in Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School District100 stated that its 
decision did “not affect any right of recovery an individual may have . . . 
against the teacher in his individual capacity . . . under [§ 1983].”101 
 
 91. See supra Part I. 
 92. See supra Part II. 
 93. 198 F.3d 633 (7th Cir. 1999). 
 94. Id. at 640. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id.; see also Waid v. Merrill Area Pub. Sch., 91 F.3d 857, 862–63 (7th Cir. 1996) 
(holding that a § 1983 claim based on the Equal Protection Clause is subsumed by Title IX 
because plaintiff alleged only one set of facts that could not give rise to two causes of 
action). 
 97. 367 F.3d 668 (7th Cir. 2004). 
 98. Id. at 675. 
 99. Id. 
 100. 524 U.S. 274 (1998). 
 101. Id. at 292. 
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Similarly, in Doe v. Smith,102 the Seventh Circuit reaffirmed its holding 
that Title IX “‘furnishes all the relief that is necessary to rectify the 
discriminatory policies or practices of the school itself.’”103  It thus barred 
the § 1983 claims against the school district and against the officials sued in 
their official capacities whose challenged conduct related solely to their 
implementation of district policy.104  Because Title IX already provided a 
cause of action against the school district, which was the recipient of federal 
financial assistance, the court held that any § 1983 claims against the school 
district were essentially identical and precluded.105  However, the court then 
ruled that Title IX should not be interpreted to preempt § 1983 liability 
against a school official sued in his individual capacity whose misconduct 
could not be rectified under Title IX.106  It reasoned that foreclosing 
individual liability claims would be contrary to Congress’s goal in enacting 
Title IX, which was to avoid the use of federal funds to support 
discriminatory practices and to shield individuals against those practices.107  
Thus, although Title IX foreclosed the § 1983 claim against the school 
district, the dean who was charged with sexually harassing and abusing 
students was subject to liability under § 1983.  Congress would not have 
intended to destroy a federal remedy for sex discrimination by school 
officials who cannot be sued under Title IX because this would insulate the 
individuals directly responsible for the injury. 
In Fitzgerald v. Barnstable School Committee,108 the case that will be 
heard by the Supreme Court this term,109 the First Circuit relied on Smith 
for the proposition that a sufficiently comprehensive remedial scheme 
precludes constitutional claims that are virtually identical to those that 
could be brought under that regime.110  The court reasoned that plaintiffs’ 
equal protection claim, which challenged the school’s failure to respond to 
reported peer-on-peer sexual harassment, was virtually identical to the 
claim brought under Title IX.111  As to the second step in Smith, i.e., 
whether Congress intended the constitutional claims to be precluded by 
Title IX, the court decided that the comprehensiveness of Title IX’s 
remedial scheme indicated that: 
Congress saw Title IX as the sole means of vindicating the constitutional 
right to be free from gender discrimination perpetrated by educational 
institutions—and that is true whether suit is brought against the 
 
 102. 470 F.3d 331 (7th Cir. 2006). 
 103. Id. at 339 (quoting Delgado, 367 F.3d at 674). 
 104. Id. at 338. 
 105. Id. at 339. 
 106. Id. at 340. 
 107. Id. at 339. 
 108. 504 F.3d 165 (1st Cir. 2007), cert. granted, 128 S. Ct. 2903 (2008). 
 109. The certiorari question is discussed infra notes 160–61 and accompanying text. 
 110. Fitzgerald, 504 F.3d at 179. 
 111. Id. 
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educational institution itself or the flesh-and-blood decisionmakers who 
conceived and carried out the institution’s response.112 
At first blush, the First Circuit appears to have adopted the total 
preclusion approach.  The court in Fitzgerald rejected plaintiffs’ claims 
against the school’s decision makers in their individual capacities, a cause 
of action not available under Title IX.113  However, the court cautioned that 
its holding should not be read to imply total foreclosure of constitutionally 
based § 1983 actions.  Citing the Seventh Circuit decision that would allow 
plaintiffs to sue individual school officials who were immediately 
responsible for the injury, the court noted, “[W]hen a plaintiff alleges that 
an individual defendant is guilty of committing an independent wrong, 
separate and apart from the wrong asserted against the educational 
institution, a claim premised on that independent wrong would not be 
‘virtually identical’ to the main claim.”114  Because in this case the claims 
brought against individual members of the school committee who failed to 
remedy the peer-on-peer harassment were identical to the claims brought 
under Title IX against the institution, the court reasoned that the § 1983 
claim was precluded by Title IX’s remedial scheme.115 
In contrast, the Sixth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits have held that Title IX 
should never be interpreted to foreclose overlapping constitutional claims.  
In Crawford v. Davis,116 the Eighth Circuit ruled that a student at the 
University of Central Arkansas, who alleged that she was subjected to 
sexual harassment and that school officials failed to respond to her 
complaints, was not precluded from bringing suit under § 1983 to enforce 
both rights under Title IX as well as claims alleging the denial of equal 
protection.117  The court reasoned that because Title IX does not expressly 
authorize private suits and does not include administrative enforcement 
procedures, Congress did not design Title IX to supersede other 
remedies.118  Subsequently, in 1999, the Eighth Circuit, like the Seventh 
Circuit, invoked Gebser to permit the plaintiff to bring § 1983 claims 
against her teacher for equal protection and due process violations.119 
 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. at 180. 
 115. Id.  Although plaintiffs sued the school superintendent, they did so only with respect 
to his role as the school committee’s ultimate decision maker, not his capacity as an 
individual immediately responsible for the injury. Id. 
 116. 109 F.3d 1281 (8th Cir. 1997). 
 117. Id. at 1284. 
 118. Id.  The court’s conclusion that Title IX rights are also enforceable under § 1983 
raises a more difficult question.  Indeed, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit 
appears to be the only circuit that permits Title IX rights to be enforced under § 1983. See 
supra Part I. 
 119. Kinman v. Omaha Pub. Sch. Dist., 171 F.3d 607, 611 (8th Cir. 1999); see also supra 
notes 100–01 and accompanying text. 
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Similarly, the Tenth Circuit, in Seamons v. Snow,120 held that Title IX did 
not preclude a football player from proceeding simultaneously under Title 
IX and under § 1983 to vindicate due process, equal protection, and First 
Amendment violations where school officials failed to take action against 
the perpetrators of a hazing incident and instead transferred the plaintiff to 
another school.121  The plaintiff alleged that the coach fostered the hostile 
environment and that the school officials’ response violated his 
constitutional rights.122  The court asserted that Title IX should not be 
interpreted to supersede constitutional claims under § 1983 because Title IX 
does not have an express provision for a private right of action.123  Neither 
the Eighth nor Tenth Circuit courts undertook an extensive analysis of why 
they were rejecting preclusion.  Indeed, neither court discussed Smith and 
its “virtually identical” test.124 
In contrast, the Sixth Circuit has provided an extensive analysis of the 
congressional foreclosure doctrine.  It has long held that Smith should not 
impede plaintiffs from bringing constitutional claims independent of Title 
IX claims because there is no “legislative history indicating a congressional 
intention to preclude reliance on section 1983 as a remedy.”125  In 1996, the 
appellate court ruled that plaintiffs bringing due process, rather than equal 
protection, claims under § 1983 were not “preempted” by Title IX because 
the constitutionally based claims were not “virtually identical” to the Title 
IX claims.126  Six years later, the Sixth Circuit addressed the more difficult 
question of whether plaintiffs bringing equal protection claims, closely 
analogous to Title IX claims, were precluded by the federal statute.  In 
Communities for Equity v. Michigan High School Athletic Ass’n,127 
plaintiffs alleged that the Michigan High School Athletic Association 
discriminated against female high school athletes by scheduling girls’ sports 
to play in disadvantageous, nontraditional seasons.128  The district court 
found that the actions of the association violated both the Equal Protection 
Clause and Title IX.  The Sixth Circuit affirmed the judgment based solely 
on the Equal Protection Clause violation.129 
 
 120. 84 F.3d 1226 (10th Cir. 1996), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 206 F.3d 1021 (10th Cir. 
2000). 
 121. Id. at 1233–34. 
 122. Id. at 1230. 
 123. Id. at 1233–34. 
 124. See id. (reasoning only that Sea Clammers resolved preemption of § 1983 statutory 
claims and thus was inapplicable to any constitutional violations). 
 125. Lillard v. Shelby County Bd. of Educ., 76 F.3d 716, 723 (6th Cir. 1996). 
 126. Id.  The court emphasized that both prongs of the Smith v. Robinson test must be 
met, requiring virtually identical constitutional and statutory claims and congressional intent 
“to preclude reliance on section 1983 as a remedy.” Id. 
 127. 377 F.3d 504 (6th Cir. 2004). 
 128. Id. at 506–10. 
 129. Id. at 515. 
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The association filed a petition for certiorari, asking the Supreme Court 
to adjudicate the implied foreclosure question.130  Instead, the Court 
vacated the decision and remanded for further consideration in light of its 
intervening decision in Rancho Palos Verdes.131  As discussed in Part I, the 
Court in this case held that a federal statute that creates rights and its own 
private judicial enforcement remedy should be presumed to foreclose 
§ 1983 enforcement of that statute.132  Rancho Palos Verdes involved the 
analytically distinct question of whether § 1983 may be used to enforce 
federal statutory, not constitutional, rights.133  It is unclear, then, why a 
remand was necessary.134  The Court’s action just adds to the confusion in 
the lower courts and appears to invite them to conflate congressional 
foreclosure of statutory claims under § 1983 with congressional foreclosure 
of constitutional claims. 
On remand, the Sixth Circuit did not accept the bait.  Instead, it carefully 
traced the history of Sea Clammers, Smith, and Rancho Palos Verdes.135  It 
explained that both Sea Clammers and Rancho Palos Verdes dealt with 
attempts to enforce federal statutory rights through the “and laws” language 
of § 1983, whereas the issue of congressional foreclosure of constitutional 
rights implicates the Smith analysis.136  It reasoned that, where plaintiffs 
seek to enforce rights created by Congress, it is more difficult to argue that 
§ 1983 can be invoked to provide remedies, such as damages and attorney’s 
fees, that go beyond those authorized in the statute itself.137  The court 
asserted that the “bedrock for the Sea Clammers principle” is “whether 
Congress intended the remedies in the substantive statute to be exclusive” 
 
 130. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Mich. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n v. Cmtys. for 
Equity, 544 U.S. 1012 (2005) (No. 06-1038) (noting the circuit split on the issue). 
 131. Michigan High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 544 U.S. 1012. 
 132. See supra notes 41–45 and accompanying text. 
 133. See supra Part I. 
 134. In Rancho Palos Verdes, Justice Antonin Scalia reasoned that, because the 
Telecommunications Act (TCA) had a thirty-day time frame for initiating enforcement 
actions, permitting suit to enforce TCA rights under § 1983 (where the statute of limitations 
is two to three years) would be fundamentally incompatible with this streamlined and 
expedited statutory scheme.  He expressed concern about affording plaintiffs a “more 
expansive remedy under § 1983” than that available under the federal statute, and he cited 
Smith for the proposition that “[t]he crucial consideration is what Congress intended.” 
Rancho Palos Verdes, 544 U.S. at 120–21 (internal quotation marks omitted).  Arguably, a 
broad reading of Justice Scalia’s concern could also envelop constitutional claims.  As 
discussed infra in Part IV, such an expansive reading of Rancho Palos Verdes is 
unwarranted and ill-advised.  In any event, it is difficult to see how plaintiffs’ ability to bring 
an implied cause of action transforms Title IX into an “exceptional” statutory scheme that is 
“unusually comprehensive and exclusive.” Id. at 131 (Stevens, J., concurring).  Further, the 
concurring opinions stressed that “the availability of a private judicial remedy [does not] 
conclusively establish[] a congressional intent to preclude § 1983 relief.” Id. at 122; see also 
infra note 164. 
 135. Cmtys. for Equity v. Mich. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 459 F.3d 676, 681–83 (6th Cir. 
2006). 
 136. Id. at 683–84. 
 137. Id. 
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and reasoned that “[t]o allow the plaintiffs in such cases to benefit from the 
additional remedies available pursuant to § 1983 would create an end-run 
around the substantive statutory remedies and contravene Congress’s 
intent.”138 
In contrast to the plaintiffs in Sea Clammers and Rancho Palos Verdes, 
the court explained that plaintiffs in Communities for Equity were asserting 
violations of the Fourteenth Amendment, which would be actionable “even 
if Congress had never enacted Title IX.”139  The question, then, was 
“whether Congress intended to abandon the rights and remedies set forth in 
Fourteenth Amendment equal protection jurisprudence when it enacted 
Title IX in 1972.”140  Answering this question in the affirmative should be 
much more difficult.141 Based on this distinction, the court was not 
persuaded that Rancho Palos Verdes required it to alter its previous 
rejection of the congressional foreclosure doctrine.142 
The Sixth Circuit panel proceeded to address the more appropriate 
question of whether Smith provided an impediment to bringing 
constitutional claims together with Title IX claims for the same 
wrongdoing.  The court stressed that Smith required both a showing that the 
constitutional claims were “virtually identical” to the statutory claims and 
that Congress intended the constitutional grievances to be pursued only 
through that statute:143  “Recovery under § 1983 is precluded by Smith only 
if both factors are satisfied.”144  Although the plaintiff’s § 1983 claims 
alleging violation of the Equal Protection Clause could be viewed as 
“virtually identical” to the statutory claims, the court nonetheless refused to 
find congressional intent to preclude use of § 1983 to enforce those 
claims.145  It reasoned that there was no evidence that Congress intended 
Title IX to be the exclusive remedy for an equal protection violation, but 
not a due process violation, and thus the “preemption” argument failed with 
 
 138. Id. at 684. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. 
 141. See Zewde v. Elgin Cmty. Coll., 601 F. Supp. 1237, 1246 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (“It is one 
thing to say, as the Supreme Court did in . . . [Sea Clammers], that a comprehensive and 
specific statute like the [Federal Water Pollution Control Act] demonstrates implicit 
congressional intent to repeal the § 1983 right of action for violations of that statute.  It is 
quite another thing to say . . . that the comprehensive Title VII framework demonstrates 
implicit Congressional intent to repeal the § 1983 right of action for concurrent violations of 
the Constitution.”). 
 142. Cmtys. for Equity, 459 F.3d at 684. 
 143. Id. at 685 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 144. Id. (citing Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1009 (1984)); see also Beth Burke, 
Note, To Preclude or Not to Preclude?  Section 1983 Claims Surviving Title IX’s Onslaught, 
78 WASH. U. L.Q. 1487, 1512 (2000) (noting that some courts fail to properly apply the 
“virtually identical” prong of the Smith test by “combin[ing] all the alleged constitutional 
violations without analyzing each claim separately under the Smith test”). 
 145. Cmtys. for Equity, 459 F.3d at 685. 
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regard to both constitutional claims.146  It also cited with approval the 
Eighth and Tenth Circuit holdings that Title IX’s remedial scheme is not 
comprehensive enough to permit an inference of congressional 
preemption.147  The contrary holdings from the Second, Third, and Seventh 
Circuits failed to distinguish Sea Clammers, which concerned application of 
§ 1983 to enforce federal statutory law, from the question of the availability 
of a § 1983 remedy to enforce independent constitutional rights.148 
The Sixth Circuit did not address the “partial” preclusion position 
adopted by the Seventh Circuit, which allows individual liability claims 
under § 1983 against those most directly responsible for the wrongdoing, 
while precluding suit against the entity.149  Partial preclusion suffers from 
the same statutory interpretation problem as total preclusion.  It insulates 
public school districts that lack “actual knowledge” of constitutional 
wrongdoing, even where policy makers cause the injury or school officials 
act with “deliberate indifference” to constitutional rights violations, thereby 
triggering entity liability under § 1983.150  It is difficult to fathom that 
Congress, in its attempt to ensure equal educational opportunity, intended to 
cut off an existing, more effective remedy, even if the claims against the 
entity under Title IX are “virtually identical” to the equal protection claim 
brought under § 1983.  In light of the reported increase in sexual 
harassment of students by fellow students and teachers,151 the partial 
preclusion doctrine creates minimal deterrence and threatens to leave many 
 
 146. Id. at 687 (“We have found no decision, either by the Supreme Court or our sister 
circuits, holding that Congress intended Title IX to be the exclusive remedy for one claim 
but not another . . . .”). 
 147. Id. at 688. 
 148. Id. at 689. 
 149. See supra notes 97–107 and accompanying text. 
 150. See, e.g., Delgado v. Stegall, 367 F.3d 668, 672 (7th Cir. 2004) (holding that Title IX 
foreclosed § 1983 claims against a state university that lacked actual knowledge of a 
teacher’s sexual harassment); cf. Flores v. Morgan Hill Unified Sch. Dist., 324 F.3d 1130, 
1135 (9th Cir. 2003) (agreeing “with . . . other circuits that have considered similar issues 
that[, where school district is sued for an equal protection violation,] the plaintiffs must show 
either that the defendants intentionally discriminated or acted with deliberate indifference”). 
  A proposed amendment to Title IX would change the standard of liability for sexual 
harassment victims suing under Title IX to require only “constructive” notice—where an 
entity knows or should know of the conduct and yet fails to take corrective action.  The 
Fairness and Individual Rights Necessary to Ensure a Stronger Society (FAIRNESS) Act 
(Civil Rights Act of 2008), H.R. 5129, 110th Cong. §§ 101, 111–12 (2008). 
 151. See Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 292 (1998) (“The number 
of reported cases involving sexual harassment of students in schools confirms that 
harassment unfortunately is an all too common aspect of the educational experience.”); 
Dawn A. Ellison, Comment, Sexual Harassment in Education:  A Review of Standards for 
Institutional Liability Under Title IX, 75 N.C. L. REV. 2049, 2051–52 (1997) (citing 
numerous findings that sexual harassment is “disturbingly prevalent in our nation’s school 
systems”). 
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victims without an effective civil rights remedy, thereby perverting the 
goals of the congressional enactment.152 
The Sixth Circuit in Communities for Equity placed great emphasis on 
the fact that, unlike the statutes in Sea Clammers and Rancho Palos Verdes, 
which explicitly designated judicial remedies, Title IX contains no express 
remedy other than a funding cutoff for noncompliant educational 
institutions.153  In Cannon v. University of Chicago,154 the Supreme Court 
found an “implied” cause of action under Title IX for plaintiffs who have 
been discriminated against on the basis of sex.155  However, the Sixth 
Circuit reasoned that, in ascertaining congressional intent to preempt, the 
inquiry should be “focused on the statute itself” rather than the judicially 
created right of action.156  Further, it noted that, when the Supreme Court in 
Cannon found an implied private cause of action under Title IX, it 
examined the legislative history and concluded that Congress did not intend 
for the statutory remedy—funding termination—to be the exclusive avenue 
for relief.157  The second prong of Smith requires some showing of 
congressional intent to foreclose a § 1983 remedy, and this legislative 
history demonstrated that Congress did not intend to cut off alternative 
ways to remedy gender bias.158  As the Sixth Circuit explained, the question 
under Smith is “whether Congress intended to create an enforcement 
scheme so comprehensive that it could serve as the exclusive avenue for 
relief, thus precluding claims under § 1983.”159  Thus, even though the 
Court in Cannon implied a private cause of action from “congressional 
silence,” this does not support implied foreclosure of constitutional claims 
under § 1983. 
 
 152. See Erwin Chemerinsky & Catherine Fisk, Civil Rights Without Remedies:  
Vicarious Liability Under Title VII, Section 1983, and Title IX, 7 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 
755, 792–93 (1999) (arguing that the court should adopt the employer liability standard of 
Title VII because of the nondelegable duty of schools to protect children from discrimination 
and the minimal deterrence the actual notice standard has in the educational context); 
Meghan E. Cherner-Ranft, Comment, The Empty Promise of Title IX:  Why Girls Need 
Courts to Reconsider Liability Standards and Preemption in School Sexual Harassment 
Cases, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1891 (2003) (arguing that because Title IX provides inadequate 
relief for plaintiffs in sexual harassment and sex discrimination suits, it should not be read to 
preclude suit under § 1983). 
 153. See 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (2000). 
 154. 441 U.S. 677 (1979). 
 155. Id. at 689; see also Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 72–73 
(1992) (extending the implied cause of action to include a claim for monetary damages). 
 156. Cmtys. for Equity v. Mich. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 459 F.3d 676, 689–90 (6th Cir. 
2006). 
 157. Cannon, 441 U.S. at 709–12. 
 158. See Cmtys. for Equity, 459 F.3d at 690–91; see also Crawford v. Davis, 109 F.3d 
1281, 1284 (8th Cir. 1997) (“[T]he [Cannon] Court has indicated that the sole express 
enforcement mechanism contained in Title IX is not exclusive.”); Lillard v. Shelby County 
Bd. of Educ., 76 F.3d 716, 723 (6th Cir. 1996) (noting that in Cannon the “Court concluded 
that implying a private right of action would . . . complement . . . the public remedy 
explicitly created in the statute”). 
 159. Cmtys. for Equity, 459 F.3d at 690–91. 
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As noted, the Supreme Court is poised to review this analysis.  It has 
agreed to hear the following question:  “Does an implied right of action 
under Title IX of 1972 Education Amendments preclude constitutional 
claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to remedy sex discrimination by federally 
funded educational institutions?”160  In finding congressional intent to 
foreclose § 1983 constitutional claims, the First Circuit relied on the 
“comprehensiveness of Title IX’s remedial scheme—especially as 
embodied in its implied private right of action.”161  As framed, the certiorari 
question focuses on whether congressional intent to provide the exclusive 
means of relief can be implied from a statute that itself contains no express 
private remedy at all. 
The thesis of this Article is that, even where a statute includes explicit 
administrative and judicial remedies, such as Title VII, this should not lead 
courts to infer congressional intent to cut off a § 1983 remedy where federal 
constitutional rights have been violated.  The Court in Rancho Palos Verdes 
stated that where the federal statute creates explicit judicial remedies, it will 
presume congressional intent to foreclose the use of § 1983.162  
Significantly, however, Rancho Palos Verdes addressed only the question 
of whether § 1983 can be used to enforce federal statutory rights where the 
statute already has an explicit private remedy that is sufficiently 
comprehensive so as to permit an inference that Congress intended that 
remedy to be exclusive. 
Permitting statutorily created rights to be enforced only through statutory 
remedies, which Congress has carefully constructed, is understandable.  
However, applying Rancho Palos Verdes and its presumption of preclusion 
to hold that comprehensive federal statutory remedies foreclose a 
historically recognized remedy for constitutional violations ignores the fact 
that the Smith inquiry is and should remain distinct.163  A broad reading of 
Rancho Palos Verdes would mean that plaintiffs pursuing constitutional 
claims of race or sex discrimination against their government employers 
would be presumptively “preempted” by Title VII, because this statute, 
unlike Title IX, contains express administrative and judicial remedies.164  
 
 160. See supra note 108 and accompanying text. 
 161. Fitzgerald v. Barnstable Sch. Comm., 504 F.3d 165, 179 (1st Cir. 2007). 
 162. See supra notes 41–45 and accompanying text.  This decision reinforced the already 
well-accepted view that the express judicial remedy under Title VII, as well as the implied 
judicial remedy under Title IX, precludes a claim under § 1983 to vindicate Title VII or Title 
IX rights. 
 163. See supra notes 139–44 and accompanying text. 
 164. As indicated, see supra note 134, such a broad reading of Rancho Palos Verdes may 
not be warranted in light of the concurring opinions.  Justice Breyer’s concurrence 
emphasized that the TCA involved “deferential consideration[s] of matters within an 
agency’s expertise.” Rancho Palos Verdes v. Abrams, 544 U.S. 113, 128 (2005) (Breyer, J., 
concurring).  In contrast, it is clear that because the Supreme Court implied a private cause 
of action under Title IX, Congress did not intend to rely solely on agency expertise, but 
rather presumed that enforcement by private attorneys general was permissible.  Justice 
Stevens stated that he would foreclose § 1983 remedies for federal statutory rights only in 
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As discussed in the next section, inferring that Congress “intended” this 
result when it sought to expand the civil rights of government employees is 
ludicrous. 
B.  Congressional Foreclosure Under Title VII 
Title VII, which prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of 
race, color, sex, religion, and national origin, was extended to cover 
government employers in 1972.165  Like Title IX, Title VII does not allow 
for individual liability claims.166  In addition, it imposes caps on 
damages,167 and it has stringent filing and administrative agency exhaustion 
requirements.168  Plaintiffs often bring § 1983 claims where Title VII 
deadlines have not been met or where they seek to hold individual 
government officials liable for sexual or racial harassment and 
discrimination.169  Because of the comprehensive nature of Title VII’s 
remedial scheme, the use of § 1983 to enforce Title VII rights has been 
rejected by most courts.170  A few courts have gone further.  They have 
relied on Smith to disallow § 1983 claims to enforce constitutional rights 
where such claims are “so tied up with their cause of action under Title VII 
 
the most exceptional cases, and he also indicated that the TCA was such a case because the 
Act was tailored to foster an expedited review process that would not be available under 
§ 1983. Id. at 129–32 (Stevens, J., concurring).  Further, Justice Stevens emphasized that 
legislative history was essential. Id.  The legislative history of Title VII in no way suggests 
preclusion of constitutional claims. See infra notes 173, 175 and accompanying text. 
 165. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(a) (2000) defines the term “person” to include “governments, 
governmental agencies [and] political subdivisions,” as well as their agents. 
 166. Although not explicitly in the text, the appellate courts have unanimously ruled that 
Congress did not contemplate individual liability. See, e.g., Dearth v. Collins, 441 F.3d 931, 
933 (11th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 153 (2006); Holly D. v. Cal. Inst. of Tech., 339 
F.3d 1158, 1179 (9th Cir. 2003); Mandell v. County of Suffolk, 316 F.3d 368, 377 (2d Cir. 
2003); Worth v. Tyer, 276 F.3d 249, 262 (7th Cir. 2001). 
 167. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3).  The cap on compensatory and punitive damages, 
which excludes back wages and interest, as well as other relief available under Title VII 
before the damage remedy was added in 1991, goes from $50,000 to $300,000 depending 
upon the number of employees. 
 168. See id. § 2000e-5(e).  A charge of discrimination must be filed with the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission within 180 days, or 300 days if the state in which the 
discrimination took place has a “deferral agency.”  In addition, a suit must be filed in court 
within 90 days of receipt of a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC. Id. § 2000e-5(f)(1); see also 
Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 127 S. Ct. 2162, 2165, 2169 (2007) (holding that 
a challenge to an employee’s paycheck, which reflects past discriminatory salary decisions 
by gender-biased supervisors, is time-barred unless an intentionally discriminatory pay 
decision occurred within 180 days of the filing of an EEOC complaint). 
 169. In addition, plaintiffs may seek to avoid the caps on compensatory and punitive 
damage awards. See supra note 167. 
 170. See, e.g., Lakoski v. James, 66 F.3d 751, 755 (5th Cir. 1995) (noting that several 
circuits have agreed that “Title VII’s comprehensive remedial scheme precludes § 1983 suits 
based upon violations of Title VII rights”). 
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that they are, in the Court’s view, nearly unidentifiable as discrete 
claims.”171 
However, the majority of courts have rejected the argument that 
Congress, by extending Title VII to reach government employers, intended 
to foreclose the historic use of § 1983 by victims of unconstitutional 
discrimination.172  The Seventh Circuit, for example, closely examined the 
legislative history of section 2 of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 
1972 and found nothing to suggest congressional intent to displace the 
 
 171. Torres v. Wis. Dep’t of Health & Soc. Servs., 592 F. Supp. 922, 930 (E.D. Wis. 
1984); see also Morris v. Oldham County Fiscal Court, 201 F.3d 784, 794–95 (6th Cir. 
2000) (holding that a plaintiff who claims he was retaliated against for filing suit under Title 
VII can only pursue relief under Title VII because Congress did not intend for this violation 
to provide the basis for a § 1983 First Amendment retaliation claim; rather, Congress chose 
to limit Title VII liability to employers only, and a plaintiff cannot use § 1983 to circumvent 
Congress’s intent through an individual liability lawsuit); Hughes v. Bedsole, 48 F.3d 1376, 
1383 n.6 (4th Cir. 1995) (noting that plaintiff “cannot bring an action under § 1983 for 
violation of her Fourteenth Amendment rights because [she] originally could have instituted 
a Title VII cause of action”); Arendale v. City of Memphis, No. 05-2190B, 2006 WL 
3053402, at *8 (W.D. Tenn. Oct. 24, 2006) (“‘[W]here the plaintiff asserts that [he] has been 
retaliated against for filing a complaint under Title VII, [his] sole federal remedy is the cause 
of action provided for under Title VII.’” (alterations in original) (quoting Morris, 201 F.3d at 
794–95)); Breech v. Scioto County Reg’l Water Dist. #1, No. 1:03CV360, 2006 WL 
2422924, at *8 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 21, 2006) (also quoting Morris, 201 F.3d at 794–95); Nancy 
Levit, Preemption of Section 1983 by Title VII:  An Unwarranted Deprivation of Remedies, 
15 HOFSTRA L. REV. 265, 278–87 (1987) (discussing Torres and its progeny and explaining 
that the court incorrectly relied on Brown v. General Service Administration, 425 U.S. 820 
(1976), which held that Title VII was the exclusive remedy for federal employees, thereby 
defeating a § 1981 claim, and Great American Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n v. Novotny, 
442 U.S. 366 (1979), which held that § 1985(3) could not be invoked to redress violations of 
Title VII—because neither involved § 1983). 
 172. Booth v. Maryland, 327 F.3d 377, 383 (4th Cir. 2003) (finding that a § 1983 claim is 
not preempted by a Title VII claim and that “‘[a]lthough discrimination claims against 
municipal employers are often brought under both Title VII and the equal protection clause 
(via [S]ection 1983), the two causes of action nonetheless remain distinct’” (quoting Thigpen 
v. Bibb County, Ga. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 223 F.3d 1231, 1239 (11th Cir. 2000))); Thigpen, 223 
F.3d at 1237–39 (holding that Title VII is not the exclusive remedy for public sector 
employment discrimination and thus a § 1983 equal protection claim may proceed alongside 
a Title VII employment discrimination claim); Southard v. Tex. Bd. of Criminal Justice, 114 
F.3d 539, 548–50 (5th Cir. 1997) (holding that Title VII does not preclude female 
correctional officers from asserting sexual harassment and sex discrimination claims under 
§ 1983, even if the claims arose from the same facts as officers’ Title VII claims because the 
Constitution provides rights independent of Title VII to be free from discrimination by 
public employers); Annis v. County of Westchester, N.Y., 36 F.3d 251, 254–55 (2d Cir. 
1994) (holding that Congress did not intend to make Title VII the exclusive remedy for 
employment discrimination claims, and thus such claims can proceed without satisfying the 
procedural requirements of Title VII); Beardsley v. Webb, 30 F.3d 524, 527 (4th Cir. 1994) 
(reasoning that nothing in the Civil Rights Act of 1991 or its legislative history demonstrates 
that Congress intended, by creating a damage remedy for Title VII, to supplant § 1983); 
Notari v. Denver Water Dep’t, 971 F.2d 585, 587–88 (10th Cir. 1992) (holding that a § 1983 
claim may be independent of Title VII even if the claims arose from the same factual 
allegations and even if the conduct violates both § 1983 and Title VII). 
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existing § 1983 remedy for Fourteenth Amendment violations.173  Further, 
the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which expanded Title VII to provide a limited 
damage remedy for intangible injury,174 such as emotional distress, should 
not be interpreted to preempt § 1983’s uncapped damage remedy.  As the 
Eleventh Circuit has explained, it would be perverse to conclude that 
Congress, while enlarging remedies under Title VII, simultaneously 
intended silently to extinguish the remedy that § 1983 had provided for 
government employees for many years.175 
The Supreme Court’s recent decision in CBOCS West, Inc. v. 
Humphries,176 lends support to the view that Congress, in enacting Title 
VII, did not intend to foreclose existing remedies.  In arguing against 
recognition of a retaliation claim under § 1981, a post–Civil War provision 
that broadly prohibits race discrimination in the making and enforcement of 
contracts,177 the defendants contended that permitting retaliation claims 
under § 1981 would allow plaintiffs to circumvent Title VII’s specific 
remedial mechanism.  The Supreme Court rejected the “overlap[ping]” 
claims concern, specifically noting that “‘Title VII was designed to 
supplement, rather than supplant, existing laws and institutions relating to 
employment discrimination.’”178  Although § 1983, unlike § 1981, does not 
create substantive rights, the Supreme Court’s discussion of Congress’s 
purpose in enacting Title VII provides a powerful argument against 
“implied” foreclosure of § 1983 constitutional claims. 
The ramifications of permitting congressional foreclosure of § 1983 
constitutional claims where Congress enacts explicit civil rights legislation 
go beyond Title IX and Title VII.  For example, Title VI prohibits race-
based discrimination by recipients of federal financial assistance.179  Title 
VI provided the model for Title IX, and the two laws are parallel except that 
Title VI prohibits race discrimination, not sex discrimination, and applies to 
all programs receiving federal funds, not only education programs.180  
Specifically in the context of preclusion, the Seventh Circuit ruled in Doe v. 
 
 173. Alexander v. Chi. Park Dist., 773 F.2d 850, 855 (7th Cir. 1985) (“Congress intended 
to retain preexisting remedies.”); see also Levit, supra note 171, at 287–88 (criticizing the 
preemption theory as unwarranted by the congressional history of Title VII and positing that, 
“Congress contemplated and consciously rejected amendments which would have made Title 
VII the exclusive remedy for unlawful employment practices”).  
 174. See supra note 167. 
 175. Johnson v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 114 F.3d 1089, 1091–92 (11th Cir. 1997), 
superseded on other grounds on reh’g, 148 F.3d 1228 (11th Cir. 1998) (reasoning that 
Congress, in enacting the Civil Rights Act of 1991, did not implicitly render Title VII the 
exclusive remedy for employment discrimination claims, and thus race discrimination 
allegations could be pursued under § 1983). 
 176. 128 S. Ct. 1951 (2008). 
 177. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2000). 
 178. CBOCS, 128 S. Ct. at 1960 (quoting Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 
48–49 (1974)). 
 179. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d to d-7. 
 180. See id.; Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 286 (1998). 
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Smith that Title VI provides “adequate statutory recourse for the alleged 
discrimination,” and thus the plaintiff’s § 1983 claim against the school 
district, alleging that the district “generally turned a blind eye to [Dean of 
Students’] abuse of African American boys” in violation of the Due Process 
and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, was 
foreclosed.181 
Other courts have interpreted the ADEA and the ADA to foreclose equal 
protection claims brought under § 1983.182  Because claims of age or 
disability discrimination trigger only rational basis review under the Equal 
Protection Clause,183 this doctrine is invoked less frequently and has fewer 
consequences.  Nonetheless, these cases demonstrate how dangerous the 
 
 181. Doe v. Smith, 470 F.3d 331, 334, 338 (7th Cir. 2006).  The court focused primarily 
on the Title IX claims brought by Doe, but preceded its discussion by stating that its analysis 
applied equally to Title VI. Id. at 338.  As discussed supra notes 102–07 and accompanying 
text, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, while precluding the § 1983 suit 
against the district and school officials sued in their official capacities, permitted the 
individual capacity § 1983 suit against the dean charged with sexually harassing and abusing 
African American boys to go forward.  In the context of a Title VI action joined with a 
§ 1983 equal protection claim, the court in Williams v. Wendler, 530 F.3d 584 (7th Cir. 
2008), reasoned, 
When Congress enacts a comprehensive scheme for enforcing a statutory right that 
is identical to a right enforceable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which creates a civil 
remedy for violations of federal rights (including constitutional rights) under color 
of state law, the section 1983 lawsuit must be litigated in accordance with the 
scheme. 
Id. at 586; see also Travis v. Folsom Cordova Unified Sch. Dist., No. 2:06-CV-2074, 2007 
WL 529840, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 20, 2007) (holding that “Title VI subsumes § 1983 claims 
which fall within Title VI’s prohibitions”); Alexander v. Underhill, 416 F. Supp. 2d 999, 
1006 (D. Nev. 2006) (“[T]his court concludes that Title VI is sufficiently comprehensive so 
as to evince the congressional intent to foreclose a section 1983 remedy.”). 
 182. See, e.g., Grey v. Wilburn, 270 F.3d 607, 610 (8th Cir. 2001) (holding that, where 
plaintiff’s § 1983 claim was predicated on the same factual allegations as his Americans with 
Disabilities Act and Rehabilitation Act claims, the court would not recognize a separate and 
independent claim under the Equal Protection Clause); Migneault v. Peck, 158 F.3d 1131, 
1140 (10th Cir. 1998), abrogated on other grounds by Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 
U.S. 62 (2000), cert. granted and judgment vacated, 528 U.S. 1110 (2000) (holding that age 
discrimination claims brought under § 1983 were preempted by the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA) because this Act provides a comprehensive statutory 
scheme within which to address age bias complaints); Zombro v. Balt. City Police Dep’t, 
868 F.2d 1364, 1367–71 (4th Cir. 1989) (holding that the detailed procedures under the 
ADEA foreclose an equal protection claim brought under § 1983); Cisneros v. Colorado, No. 
03CV02122, 2005 WL 1719755, at *8 (D. Colo. July 22, 2005) (finding that a claim of age 
discrimination brought pursuant to Section 1983 is preempted by the ADEA); Cataldo v. 
Moses, No. 02-2588, 2005 WL 705359, at *15 (D.N.J. Mar. 29, 2005) (concluding that the 
ADEA precludes a claim brought under the Equal Protection Clause); George v. Kan. State 
Univ., No. 90-2274-0, 1991 WL 205024 (D. Kan. Sept. 9, 1991) (“[T]he Fourth Circuit 
carefully examined the provisions of the ADEA [in Zombro] and concluded that they 
demonstrated congressional intent to foreclose age discrimination claims under section 1983.  
Although not bound by Zombro, th[is] court finds the reasoning therein persuasive and 
adopts it in full.” (citation omitted)). 
 183. Heller v. Doe ex rel. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 328–30 (1993) (applying rational basis 
analysis to a law that discriminated against the mentally retarded); Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. 
Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312 (1976) (applying rational basis analysis to age bias claim). 
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implicit foreclosure doctrine is in that it may be used to trump individual or 
entity claims for irrational age or disability discrimination. 
IV.  WHY IMPLIED CONGRESSIONAL PRECLUSION OF CONSTITUTIONAL 
CLAIMS SHOULD BE REJECTED 
To critique the judicially created congressional preclusion doctrine, it is 
important to understand why the Supreme Court originally adopted it and 
how it has strayed from those initial underpinnings.  As this Article 
explains, the Supreme Court created the congressional preclusion doctrine 
for two reasons.  First, it sought to rein in the use of § 1983 to enforce non–
civil rights statutes based on its belief that Congress never intended § 1983 
to be used in this way.184  Second, in light of the vast expansion of the 
federal bureaucracy, including dozens of federal laws intended to be 
implemented by state and local governments, the Supreme Court feared that 
a broad interpretation of § 1983 would subject those governments to 
significant liability.185  Growing concerns based on federalism and 
separation of powers have led the Supreme Court in recent years to cut back 
on the use of § 1983 to enforce federal statutes.  However, as this section 
explains, neither separation of powers, reflected in rules of statutory 
construction, nor federalism, justifies preclusion of § 1983 constitutional 
claims. 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Smith to extend implied foreclosure to 
include constitutional claims was ill-conceived in light of the historic 
purpose of § 1983, which was to vindicate constitutional violations 
perpetrated under color of state law.186  When Congress seeks to expand 
civil rights, it is counterintuitive to believe that Congress intends to 
foreclose this historic use of § 1983.  When the judiciary “infers” this, it 
violates separation of powers.  It engages in a form of policy making that 
belongs to the legislative branch.  The Smith opinion was in large part 
motivated by the narrow concern that plaintiffs should not secure attorney’s 
fees by simply adding “surplus” constitutional claims.187  The Court 
suggested that Congress likely purposefully excluded a fee provision in the 
EHA so as to conserve resources for educating needy children.188  
Congress’s swift reversal of Smith demonstrates that courts should tread 
warily when interpreting modern civil rights statutes to foreclose § 1983 
 
 184. See supra Part I. 
 185. See supra Part I. 
 186. See supra notes 14–15 and accompanying text. 
 187. See supra notes 57–60 and accompanying text. 
 188. See supra notes 61–62 and accompanying text.  The fees question is not an issue 
when claims are brought under Title IX or Title VII because both include their own fee 
provision:  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (2000) allows fees for the “prevailing party” in a Title 
VII action; 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) permits fees in suits pursued under various civil rights 
provisions, including § 1983, Title IX, and Title VI. 
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constitutional litigation.189  Although Congress may expressly state that its 
statutory remedy must be used in lieu of § 1983, the doctrine of “implied” 
foreclosure is a usurpation of legislative power.190 
Further, implied foreclosure of constitutional claims is contrary to 
accepted rules of statutory construction.  In his dissent to Smith, Justice 
William Brennan acknowledged that disallowing plaintiffs to bypass a 
detailed and comprehensive administrative scheme established in the EHA 
by bringing suit directly under § 1983 may be consistent with the 
established principle of statutory construction “that conflicting statutes 
should be interpreted so as to give effect to each but to allow a later 
enacted, more specific statute to amend an earlier, more general statute only 
to the extent of the repugnancy between the two statutes.”191  Justice 
Brennan explained that this rule may require that EHA claims first be 
exhausted before seeking redress under § 1983.  However, it does not mean 
that suit under § 1983 and attorney’s fees are unavailable, because there is 
no “repugnancy,” and nothing in the language or the legislative history of 
the EHA reflects Congress’s intent to bar recovery of fees for those who 
prevail under § 1983.  Instead, the Court should have followed the familiar 
rule of statutory construction that “[r]epeals by implication . . . are strongly 
disfavored.”192  As Justice Brennan opined, the denial of § 1983 and § 1988 
relief to individuals seeking a free appropriate education 
 
 189. Congress’s response to numerous restrictive judicial interpretations of its civil rights 
laws, including Title IX and Title VII, demonstrates that Congress intended these enactments 
to be read broadly to expand rights.  See, for example, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7, in which 
Congress abrogated the states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity in response to a judicial 
decision imposing this barrier; and the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, 20 U.S.C. 
§ 1687 (2000), in which Congress reversed a Supreme Court decision by unequivocally 
mandating that the judiciary give Title IX a “broad application,” whereby any program that 
discriminates on the basis of sex in an institution that receives federal funds may be held 
liable, regardless of whether that particular discriminatory program receives federal funds.  
Further, the Civil Rights Act of 1991 had as its stated purpose the need “to respond to recent 
decisions of the Supreme Court by expanding the scope of relevant civil rights statutes in 
order to provide adequate protection to victims of discrimination.” Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 
Stat. 1071, 1071 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e).  The Act overturned some seven or eight 
Rehnquist Court rulings that had reduced individual protection from discrimination by 
narrowly construing Title VII, as well as 42 U.S.C. § 1981, which prohibits race 
discrimination in the making of contracts. See BODENSTEINER & LEVINSON, supra note 24, § 
3:11 (discussing changes to § 1981); id. §§ 5:36–5:38 (discussing revisions to Title VII).   
 190. The Supreme Court has noted that, because § 1983 provides an “‘alternative source 
of express congressional authorization of private suits,’” the difficult separation of powers 
concerns triggered when the Court implies a right of action are absent. Wilder v. Va. Hosp. 
Ass’n, 496 U.S. 498, 509 n.9 (1990) (quoting Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. Nat’l 
Sea Clammers Ass’n, 453 U.S. 1, 19 (1981)). 
 191. Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1024 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing Watt 
v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 267 (1981); Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co., 426 U.S. 148, 153 
(1976); Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551 (1974)). 
 192. Id. at 1026 (citations omitted).  The dissent emphasized that the fee provision was 
enacted after the EHA and that the majority’s ruling undermines the enactment of this 
provision. Id. 
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runs counter to well-established principles of statutory interpretation.  It 
finds no support in the terms or legislative history of the EHA.  And, most 
importantly, it undermines the intent of Congress . . . .  It is at best ironic 
that the Court has managed to impose this burden on handicapped 
children in the course of interpreting a statute wholly intended to promote 
the educational rights of those children.193 
In recent years, Supreme Court Justices and constitutional scholars have 
engaged in a contentious debate regarding the appropriate role of the Court 
in construing federal statutes.  Reflecting separation of powers concerns, 
Justice Antonin Scalia and Justice Clarence Thomas have insisted on a strict 
textualist approach, urging judges to examine only statutory text.194  Other 
Justices have emphasized the importance of looking to legislative history 
and context in interpreting statutes.195  For example, Justice Stephen Breyer 
believes that courts should determine congressional intent and that a key 
interpretative resource is legislative history.196  Others have urged that 
statutory interpretation should be based on an assessment of a law’s 
 
 193. Id. at 1030–31. 
 194. Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System:  The Role of United 
States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF 
INTERPRETATION:  FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 3, 14–37 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997).  In 
Ali v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 128 S. Ct. 831 (2008), Justice Clarence Thomas closely 
examined statutory text, cautioning that “[w]e are not at liberty to rewrite the statute to 
reflect a meaning we deem more desirable,” id. at 841. See also Frank H. Easterbrook, Text, 
History, and Structure in Statutory Interpretation, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 61 (1994). 
 195. See, for example, the concurring opinions of Justice Breyer and Justice Stevens in 
Rancho Palos Verdes, 544 U.S. 113, 126–32; see also supra note 45, and Justice Anthony 
Kennedy’s dissent in Ali, joined by Justice Stevens, Justice David Souter, and Justice Breyer, 
urging that although statutory interpretation “requires respect for the text,” this should not 
“foreclose consideration of the text within the whole context of the statute as a guide to 
determining a legislature’s intent.  To prevent textual analysis from becoming so rarefied 
that it departs from how a legislator most likely understood the words when he or she voted 
for the law, courts use certain interpretative rules to consider text within the statutory 
design.” Ali, 128 S. Ct. at 841 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 196. See Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes, 65 
S. CAL. L. REV. 845, 847 (1992).  Justice Breyer has scored a significant victory for his 
approach in the recent decisions of CBOCS West, Inc. v. Humphries, 128 S. Ct. 1951, 1961 
(2008) (holding that 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2000), which prohibits race discrimination in the 
making and enforcement of contracts, encompasses a retaliation claim), and Gomez-Perez v. 
Potter, 128 S. Ct. 1931, 1943 (2008) (holding that the federal sector provision of the ADEA, 
29 U.S.C. § 633a(a) (2000), prohibits retaliation against a federal employee who complains 
of age discrimination).  Although the plain text of neither § 1981 nor § 633a(a) expressly 
refers to retaliation, the Court relied on “the pertinent interpretive history” of these 
provisions, namely stare decisis, to recognize retaliation claims under both. CBOCS, 128 S. 
Ct. at 1955.  Justice Breyer in CBOCS conceded that “the statute’s language does not 
expressly refer to [retaliation],” but stated that this was not determinative. Id. at 1958.  
Justice Samuel Alito, who authored Gomez-Perez suggested that he was not straying from 
text—rather, he was “guided by our prior decisions interpreting similar language in other 
antidiscrimination statutes.” Gomez-Perez, 128 S. Ct. at 1936.  However, Justice Scalia and 
Justice Thomas, in their dissents to both decisions, chastised the majority for ignoring the 
text of these statutes. See CBOCS, 128 S. Ct. at 1961–62 (Thomas, J., dissenting); Gomez-
Perez, 128 S. Ct. at 1951 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
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underlying purpose,197 or that it should reflect the communicative process 
whereby laws are actually enacted.198 
All of these methods of statutory interpretation have been amply 
critiqued by constitutional scholars.  Strict textualists contend that an 
examination of legislative history is highly subjective and indeterminate 
and that it ignores the principle of legislative supremacy set forth in Article 
I of the Constitution.199  Those who oppose strict textualism argue that 
language is inherently ambiguous and that the realities of the legislative 
process mandate looking beyond text to examine congressional purpose.200  
In particular, scholars have noted that the text of employment 
discrimination statutes, like Title VII, often reflect political compromise 
between members of the two political parties as well as compromises 
between the House and Senate, thereby justifying a closer look at legislative 
history to ascertain congressional intent.201 
Significantly, none of the proposed methods of statutory interpretation 
justifies the doctrine of implied congressional foreclosure.  The strict 
textualists on the Supreme Court, including Justices Scalia and Thomas, 
have long expounded the dangers of making inferences from congressional 
silence.  Because neither Title IX nor Title VII, nor any of the other civil 
rights statutes, mentions § 1983, implied foreclosure violates separation of 
powers and fails to show proper respect for the legislative branch of 
government.  If the “plain meaning of the statute’s text” is the only 
 
 197. See, e.g., HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS:  BASIC 
PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 1374–80 (1958) (contending that 
judges must first decide the purpose of a statute); Abner S. Greene, The Missing Step of 
Textualism, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1913, 1920–31 (2006) (providing pragmatic and 
theoretical arguments for “intentionalism”); see also Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes 
in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 405, 434, 464, 468 (1989) (arguing that courts 
should interpret federal statutes aspirationally, to improve on the legislative process by 
examining various substantive canons).  More recently, Professor Cass Sunstein has 
observed that, for the “hard statutory questions,” “policy arguments . . . often play a central 
role, even in a period in which ‘textualism’ has seemed on the ascendancy.” Cass R. 
Sunstein, Beyond Marbury:  The Executive’s Power to Say What the Law Is, 115 YALE L.J. 
2580, 2592–93 (2006). 
 198. Cheryl Boudreau, Arthur Lupia, Mathew D. McCubbins & Daniel B. Rodriguez, 
What Statutes Mean:  Interpretive Lessons from Positive Theories of Communication and 
Legislation, 44 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 957 (2007) (contending that, because the compression 
process—compressing multiple sources of information into a single statutory command—
generates laws, some interpretive effort to unpack their meaning is required and 
communication theory provides guidelines for doing so). 
 199. See, e.g., Easterbrook, supra note 194, at 61 (criticizing legislative history as subject 
to manipulation); John F. Manning, Textualism as a Nondelegation Doctrine, 97 COLUM. L. 
REV. 673, 696–705 (1997) (criticizing the use of legislative history as indeterminate).  
Justice Scalia criticizes legislative history both on grounds that it is indeterminate and that it 
is subject to manipulation. See Scalia, supra note 194, at 31–36. 
 200. See supra notes 196–97. 
 201. James J. Brudney, Intentionalism’s Revival, 44 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1001, 1016–18 
(2007) (discussing the empirical research on the Supreme Court’s use of legislative history 
and citing numerous decisions in which the Supreme Court has relied heavily on legislative 
history to assist in construing race and sex discrimination statutes). 
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legitimate criterion for statutory interpretation,202 implied congressional 
foreclosure of § 1983 constitutional claims should be rejected. 
The nontextualist approach, which seeks to ascertain congressional 
purpose, primarily by examining legislative history, yields the same result.  
The legislative history of each of the modern civil rights statutes 
demonstrates Congress’s intent to expand civil rights by creating additional, 
not substitute, remedies for their vindication.203  In general, the Supreme 
Court has recognized that statutory “repeals by implication are 
disfavored.”204  In North Haven Board of Education v. Bell,205 the Court 
rejected the argument that Title VII and § 1983 foreclosed the use of Title 
IX to reach sex-based employment discrimination.  The Court reasoned, 
“even if alternative remedies are available and their existence is relevant . . . 
this Court repeatedly has recognized that Congress has provided a variety of 
remedies, at times overlapping, to eradicate employment discrimination.”206  
Similarly, the Court in Gebser cautioned that its interpretation of Title IX 
did not affect individual capacity claims that could be brought under 
§ 1983.207  And, as discussed in Part III.B, the Court recently rejected the 
argument that Title VII should preclude a retaliation claim under § 1981, 
instead recognizing that “‘Title VII was designed to supplement, rather than 
supplant, existing laws.’”208  More broadly, the Court has acknowledged 
that “[s]ubstantive rights conferred in the 19th century [civil rights acts] 
were not withdrawn, sub silentio, by the subsequent passage of the modern 
statutes.”209  Although § 1983 does not itself create substantive rights, it 
provides the vehicle by which to enforce constitutional rights—the right to 
seek redress for their deprivation “under color of state law”—and thus 
courts should be reluctant to infer sub silentio withdrawal of this significant 
tool for vindicating constitutional wrongdoing. 
Nothing in the legislative history of any of the modern civil rights laws 
justifies congressional foreclosure of § 1983; rather, Congress has merely 
provided alternative ways to reach civil rights violations.  The core 
criticism of using legislative history to ascertain congressional intent is that 
it is indeterminate and can be manipulated by activist interpreters.  
However, only gross manipulation of legislative history leads courts to 
 
 202. Scalia, supra note 194, at 16–17. 
 203. See supra notes 157–58, 173–75 (discussing the legislative history of Title IX and 
Title VII, respectively). 
 204. Hagen v. Utah, 510 U.S. 399, 416 (1994). 
 205. 456 U.S. 512 (1982). 
 206. Id. at 536 n.26; see also CBOCS West, Inc. v. Humphries, 128 S. Ct. 1951, 1959–60 
(2008) (rejecting the argument that the Court should not recognize a retaliation claim under 
§ 1981 because this would overlap with Title VII and allow plaintiffs to circumvent Title 
VII’s specific remedial mechanism). 
 207. See supra notes 100–01 and accompanying text. 
 208. CBOCS, 128 S. Ct. at 1960 (quoting Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 
48–49 (1974)); see supra notes 176–78. 
 209. Great Am. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Novotny, 442 U.S. 366, 377 (1979). 
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construe modern civil rights statutes as evincing congressional intent to 
foreclose the use of the historically recognized cause of action for 
vindicating constitutional wrongdoing perpetrated under color of state law.  
There is absolutely no discussion of this subject in the legislative history.  
In 1972, when Congress enacted Title IX and expanded Title VII to reach 
state and local government employees, the doctrine of implied foreclosure 
of constitutional claims was unknown.  It was not until 1984 in Smith that 
the judiciary crafted this new, ill-conceived rule of statutory construction. 
Some lower courts that have rejected § 1983 constitutional claims assert 
that Congress, through its more focused civil rights law, has “preempted” 
§ 1983.210  This use of the term “preemption” is misplaced.  Preemption 
refers to the doctrine whereby a federal statute trumps an overlapping state 
law.211  Unlike “implied” preclusion, it is not a purely judge-made doctrine; 
rather, it has its source in the Constitution, namely the Supremacy Clause of 
Article VI.  Further, even under federal preemption doctrine, the Supreme 
Court has recognized that preemption of state laws should not occur absent 
evidence of a “clear and manifest purpose of Congress.”212  Where there is 
no explicit preemptive language in a federal statute, the Court has 
recognized “implied preemption” only where Congress has pervasively 
regulated an entire field or where there is conflict preemption:  “where 
‘compliance with both federal and state regulations is a physical 
impossibility,’ or where state law ‘stands as an obstacle to the 
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of 
Congress.’”213  Applying this doctrine by analogy, mandating government 
compliance with both constitutional norms enforceable under § 1983 and 
federal statutory nondiscrimination laws is not a physical impossibility, nor 
 
 210. See, e.g., Boulahanis v. Bd. of Regents, 198 F.3d 633, 640–41 (7th Cir. 1999) 
(holding that plaintiffs’ claims against individual officials under § 1983 were preempted by 
Title IX); Pfeiffer v. Marion Ctr. Area Sch. Dist., 917 F.2d 779, 789 (3d Cir. 1990) (holding 
that Title IX “preempted” § 1983 claims for Fourteenth Amendment violations).  Even those 
courts that have rejected congressional preclusion frequently use “preemption” terminology. 
See Cmtys. for Equity v. Mich. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 459 F.3d 676, 687 (6th Cir. 2006); 
Lillard v. Shelby County Bd. of Educ., 76 F.3d 716, 723 (6th Cir. 1996). 
 211. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:  PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 392–96 (3d 
ed. 2006). 
 212. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 213. Gade v. Nat’l Solid Waste Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 98 (1992) (quoting Fla. Lime 
& Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142–48 (1963)).  A plurality opinion relied 
on implied preemption.  Justice Kennedy concurred in the judgment, contending that 
preemption was mandated by the express terms of the federal statute in question. Id. at 109 
(Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).  However, he criticized the 
plurality’s “undue expansion of our implied preemption,” arguing that “[a] freewheeling 
judicial inquiry into whether a state statute is in tension with federal objectives would 
undercut the principle that it is Congress rather than the courts that preempts state law.” Id. 
at 109, 111; see also Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225, 265–90 (2000) (arguing 
that there is no constitutional basis for “obstacle” preemption). 
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may § 1983 be viewed as an “obstacle” to accomplishing the 
antidiscrimination objectives of modern civil rights statutes. 
Finally, as to federalism concerns, even the most conservative Justices 
understand that state sovereignty arguments give way when state or local 
government officials violate the Fourteenth Amendment.  In upholding 
Congress’s power to enact Title VII and to hold state government liable for 
discrimination against government employees, Justice William Rehnquist in 
1976 explained that “[w]hen Congress acts pursuant to § 5 [of the 
Fourteenth Amendment], not only is it exercising legislative authority that 
is plenary within the terms of the constitutional grant, it is exercising that 
authority under one section of a constitutional Amendment whose other 
sections by their own terms embody limitations on state authority.”214  He 
observed that the Fourteenth Amendment “quite clearly contemplates 
limitations on [state] authority”215 and represents a “shift in the federal-state 
balance.”216  Congress enacted § 1983 precisely to guarantee protection for 
Fourteenth Amendment rights.217  Principles of federalism or state 
sovereignty that might otherwise be an obstacle evaporate when Congress 
seeks to enforce the Civil War Amendments because these amendments 
were specifically designed to expand federal power and to restrain state 
sovereignty.218  The whole purpose of § 1983 was to vindicate 
constitutional wrongdoing, and it is clear that federalism concerns are at 
their lowest ebb when plaintiffs through § 1983 seek to remedy Fourteenth 
Amendment violations. 
CONCLUSION 
Since 1984, the Supreme Court has not invoked Smith to preclude the use 
of § 1983 to enforce constitutional rights.  Congress responded swiftly to 
rebuke the Supreme Court’s misinterpretation of its statute in Smith, and the 
Court has not again treaded into these murky waters.  However, 
congressional foreclosure is increasingly being used in the lower courts, and 
thus, it is time for the Supreme Court to acknowledge its error and to 
reverse the decision.  In the alternative, Smith should be limited to cases 
where both of its factors are satisfied—namely there must be a showing that 
(1) the federal and statutory claims are “virtually identical” and that (2) the 
remedies provided in the statute indicate congressional intent to preclude 
reliance on § 1983 because § 1983 litigation would obstruct the newly 
created congressional scheme.  Smith presented a unique situation where the 
 
 214. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976). 
 215. Id. at 453. 
 216. Id. at 455. 
 217. See supra notes 14–15 and accompanying text. 
 218. See United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151, 158–59 (2006).  In United States v. 
Georgia, Justice Scalia acknowledged the well-established principle that Congress has the 
authority to vindicate violations of the Fourteenth Amendment, even where states will be 
subject to money damages. Id. 
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Court feared that fee awards would eat up scarce resources.  In addition, it 
arguably believed that Congress intended for public school students to 
vindicate their right to equal educational opportunity via a multilevel 
review process that would best ensure a child’s correct placement.  At most, 
Smith should be read as a sui generis/one-way ticket decision. 
Further, the Supreme Court should clarify that its decision in Rancho 
Palos Verdes involved only the issue of congressional preclusion of federal 
statutory claims under § 1983 and does not control constitutional claims.  
The Supreme Court’s unfortunate remand of the Communities for Equity 
case, involving Title IX’s alleged foreclosure of § 1983 constitutional 
claims, has fueled further mischief in the federal appellate courts.  The 
Court now has agreed to resolve the current circuit split on the Title IX 
question, and it should take this opportunity to intern or severely restrict 
Smith and leave to Congress the task of assessing the best way to vindicate 
violations of our constitutional and civil rights. 
 
